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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
W. S. HATCH CO., a Utah corporation, 
Petitvoner, 
-vs.-
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF' 
UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT, DONALD Case No. 
HACKING, STEW ART M. HANSON, its 8182 
Commissioners; THE DENVER AND 
RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD 
CO., a Delaware corporation; THE 
UNION P ACIFIG RAILROAD COM-
PANY, a Utah corporation; and GUY 
PRICHARD, dba Guy Prichard Transfer, 
Respondents 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF 
In their brief the respondents, Public Service Com-
mission and Guy Prichard, cite the case of Ashworth 
Transfer Co. et al. v. Public Service Commvssion, et al., 
268 P. 2d 990, ______ Utah ------, as one which "cannot be dis-
tinguished in substance from the one here" and as a case 
which "unanimously resolved that question (the right 
of Prichard to transport acid) in Prichard's favor." 
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2 
We submit that the case is not in point, does not re-
solve any question in Prichard's favor, but does in fact 
specifically indicate the evils which result from a con-
struction such as that contended for by respondents. 
In that case the court was considering whether "·explo-
sives" were "supplies ... incidental to ... operation (of 
facilities) ... for the ... production of natural gas and 
petroleum." The court so held, being aided by the fact 
that the term "explosives" was specifically rnentioned as 
one of the products which the carrier in that case was au-
thorized to haul. Furthermore, explosives are used in 
the development and prod.uction of natural gas and pet-
roleum. Acids are not. 
The following quotations from the case are, we think, 
significant and helpful in determining the type of com-
modities which Prichard is authorized to haul. The au-
thority being construed therein is, for all practical pur-
poses, identical to Prichard's. 
"The transporters of heavy and bulky articles 
are frequently referred to in the industry as heavy 
haulers and riggers, terminology which in large 
measure describes the service performed by them . 
. . . The commodities transported by this group 
of carriers are of such size or weight as to require 
special devices for their loading and unloading 
and the use of special equipment for their move-
ment over the road." 
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3 
The court quoted the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion as follows in pointing out some of the infirmities 
connected with a grant of authority in the language under 
consideration : 
"On the other hand, a broad grant of author-
ity under a generic heading often leads to abuse:s 
through 'weird theories of interpretation and con-
srtuction' to justify hauling commodities not con-
templated by the grant." (Emphasis added.) 
The court further described the commodities covered 
by the authority as those that "may vary from a heavy 
piece of machinery to a huge girder." 
We urge the court to consider the apparent difficulty 
encountered by the Commission and by the respondent 
Prichard in arriving at a theory which will support the 
Commission's order and Prichard's contention that he has 
authority to transport acid in bulk in tank truck vehicles. 
No less than four such theories have been advanced-
some of which have been rejected by the respondents 
themselves. They are as follows: 
1. The Commission chose to justify its action on 
the basis of a previously existing contract carrier 
permit which was not put in evidence and about which 
we know nothing. See pages 9 to 14 of petitioner's brief. 
2. During the hearing counsel for respondent Prich-
ard advanced the theory that he could haul acid because 
it required "special equipment," (seeR. 106): 
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"MR. FINLINSON: Well, our position is 
that under our authority we can haul acid, in that 
acid requires special equipment and under our 
authority we can haul it." 
3. Later in the hearing counsel chose to base his 
contention on the theory that acid required a "special 
service" in preparing it for shipment or setting it up after 
delivery (seeR. 109, 110): 
"MR. FINLINSON: Gentlemen, I call your 
attention to paragraph 2 of his authority: 
'Commodities in connection with the 
transporting of which is rendered a special 
service in preparing such commodities for 
shipment or setting up after delivery or 
otherwise rendering a needed service not a 
part of the ordinary act of transporting and 
not now regularly furnished by other regular 
common carriers for the regular line rates.' 
"Now, Gentlemen, I submit that that covers 
the hauling of acid, ... " 
These first three theories have been covered in peti-
tioner's original brief to which we invite the court's 
attention. 
4. At page 5 of respondents' brief respondents re-
jected the theory adopted by the Commission in the 
following language: 
"Whatever pre-existing contract carrier per-
mit Prichard had or did not have is here immater-
ial since his present authority includes the trans-
portation of acid in the designated areas. We so 
contend." (Emphasis added.) 
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5. On page 3 of respondents' brief they adopt still 
another and we suppose a final theory to sustain their 
position, by stating: 
"Sulphuric acid is a 'supply' ... used in, the 
... operation, of facilities for the ... development, 
and production of ... minerals,' (uranium) and 
as such, is a commodity Prichard is authorized 
to transport." 
To sustain this theory the court must find that a uran-
ium processing mill is a facility used for the "discovery, 
development and production of natural gas and petrol-
eum or minerals." The terms "discovery," "d'evelopment" 
and (• produ.ction" have a very definite and well defined 
meaning in the oil and gas and mining industries. A 
miner or prospector discovers a mineral in place. He 
then does what is commonly called "development work" 
to determine the existence of the mineral or of the oil 
and gas field. After the ground is sufficiently developed 
to warrant the expenditure of additional ti1ne, effort and 
money the oil, gas or mineral is produced, that is to say, 
it is extracted from the earth. If the operation is success-
ful we have what is commonly known as a "producing 
well" or a "producing mine." Once the oil, gas or mineral 
is separated from the earth the production thereof is at 
an end. The subsequent step of refining, milling, smelt-
ing or processing is entirely separate and distinct from 
the discovery, development and production. We submit 
that Prichard's contention is one of the "weird construc-
tions" referred to in the Ashworth case. If he is able 
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to haul acid to uranium processing mills under his pres-
ent authority he is likewise able to haul any "supply" to 
any oil refinery or to any smelter. Furthermore, under 
his contention the "supply" need not "be such as" those 
specifically mentioned in his authority. Certainly acid 
has no more relation to the heavy commodities mentioned 
in Prichard's authority than would office supplies, office 
furniture, oil, gasoline, -or any other of the hundreds of 
different types of supplies used by smelting companies 
and oil refineries. 
Counsel has conceded that sulphuric acid i's not a 
supply used in a facility for the discovery of minerals 
so we have limited our authorities to those defining the 
terms "development" and "production." 
The eases clearly show that the terms "development" 
and "production" apply only to the processes of locating 
the oil, gas or mineral and extracting it from the ground. 
In the case of Blewett v. Hoyt, 103 N.Y.S. 451, 457; 118 
App. Div. 227, the court defined the term "develop" as 
follows: 
"To 'develop' is defined by Webster to be 'to 
free from that which enfolds or envelopes; to lay 
open by degrees or in detail, to disclose, to .pro-
duce or give forth,' and, by the Standard Diction-
ary 'to uncover or unfold; to bring to light by 
degree, work out in detail.' Thus to develop a min-
ing claim is to uncover or bring forth that which 
it produces or can produce." 
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In the Vtah case of Miller v. PeruviG!n Consolidated 
Mining Company, 11 P. 2d 291, 294, 79 Utah 401, this 
court stated: 
"The incorporators use the terms 'working' 
and 'developing' which ordinarily have application 
to the mines .or claim·s for the purpose of getting 
the ores." (Emphasis added.) 
In the case of Harrwver Co. v. Hines, 11 S.W. 2d 621, 
the court held that there was a plain distinction between 
an obligation to develop land in order t.o determine num-
ber, location and value of oil-bearing sands, if any, and 
an obligation to bring the oil and gas to the surface or to 
preserve such minerals thereafter. 
In the case of Charlton v. Kelly, 166 F. 433, 84 CCA 
295, the court held that the term "development" as used 
in an instruction regarding the necessity of a discovery 
in a. lode mining claim, was the equivalent of "explora-
tion." 
In the case of Lacer u. Sumpter, 249 S.W. 1026; 
198 Ky. 752, the court held that in the oil industry a 
provision in a lease requiring the lessee to continue "de-
velopment" of the property must be construed as a con-
tinuation of the work in hand in a manner that would 
discover oil if it existed and promote its "production." 
The following cases construe the term "production": 
Tedrow v. Shaffer, 155 N.E. 510, 511; 23 Ohio App. 
343. 
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Under oil and gas lease for ten years and as much 
longer as oil is "found" in paying quantities the word 
"found" is synonymous with the word "produced" which 
refers to oil when brought to the surface. 
In Re S;Niclati,r Pratirti.e Co 53 P 2d 221 223 · 175 
VI!,< U " " o' o ' ' 
Okla. 289. 
Oil may be said to be "produced" for gross produc-
tion taxation purpose's when it is brought to surface and 
confined in such a rnanner as to permit its measurement 
as to quantity and its testing as to value. 
So. Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 76 S.E. 961, 965; 71 
W.Va. 438. 
The terms "produced" and "produced in paying 
quantities" and "found in paying quantitie's" as used 
in an oil and gas lease are synonymous. 
We submit that the terms discovery, development 
and production cannot fairly be construed to mean refin-
ing, milling, smelting or processing. Witnes·s Riddle 
clearly explained the processing which takes place at ·a 
uranium mill. The uranium is extracted from the ore by 
a carbonate or soda ash leaching process which consi'sts of 
roasting or baking the ore at temperatures to 800°C. in 
a solution in which sulphuric acid is used. (R. 212.) 
Furthermore, the "supplies" to which re·spondent 
refers must be read in light of the specific commodities 
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9 
mentioned in paragraph 1 of Prichard's authority and 
cannot be of a type wholly different from those desig-
nated. \V e cannot completely disregard the rule of 
ejusdem generis. 
There is still another factor which points up the 
fallacy in respondents' theory. If Prichard's authority 
to haul acid is dependent upon his authority to haul sup--
plies used in the operation of a facility for the discovery, 
development and production of minerals, how then does 
he justify the Commission's action in giving him au-
thority to transport acid to the Utah Power & Light 
steam electric generating plant in Castle Gate~ The 
sulphuric acid is used at this generating plant as a water 
softener and the plant itself has no other purpose than 
to generate electricity. Does Prichard contend that this, 
too, is the development or production of oil, gas or min-
erals J Furthermore, the Commission's order does not 
restrict Prichard in any way as to what customers he can 
serve; hence, it is apparent that the Commission does not 
adopt Prichard's theory and Prichard (and we suppose 
the Attorney General) have expressly denounced the 
Commission's theory. 
CONCLUSION 
Prichard's authority covers the transportation of 
heavy, bulky, solid commodities and cannot be interpreted 
to include transportation of acid in bulk in tank truck 
vehicles. 
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We further contend that the Commission's finding 
as to the area needing truck transportation is too re-
strictive in light of the evidence which clearly showed 
many and varied sources of new and spent acid as well as 
many and varied uses therefor. Since no other truck 
carrier is authorized to transport acid the Commission 
abused its discretion in not granting the application in 
its entirety. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARR, WILKINS & CANNON 
MARK K. BOYLE 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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